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Introduction
On 29 March 2011, after weeks of harsh domestic political debate on how Sweden
should respond to the international calls for a peace operation in Libya, the Swedish
government decided that Sweden should participate in the United Nations (UN)
sanctioned no-ﬂy zone over the North African country.1 By making this decision,
Sweden became the only country, neither a member of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) nor the Arab League, to participate in the no-ﬂy zone.2 In
addition, the Swedish Air Force had not been involved in military action since 1963,
in a UN-sanctioned operation in the former Belgian Congo. However, the decision
also followed a clear pattern of Swedish foreign policy, that is contributing with
peace keeping and peace enforcement troops to UN-mandated missions. Thus, for
Sweden not to have joined the Libya operation would actually have been a more
unusual behavior, ‘even though the presence of the air force added a new dimension
to this particular mission’ (Dahl, 2012, p. 5).
© 2014 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748 International Politics Vol. 51, 2, 196–213
www.palgrave-journals.com/ip/
Although Sweden’s long tradition of participating in UN-mandated operations is
well documented in previous research (Dalsjö, 1995; Ångström, 2010; Björkdahl,
2013), there are very few single case studies investigating in depth why Sweden joined
a particular operation, taking as their point of departure theories of foreign policy
decision-making. By explaining why the Swedish government made the decision to
participate in the Libya operation, this article intends to make a contribution to the
study of Swedish foreign policy and to the literature on humanitarian intervention
decision making. Humanitarian intervention is here deﬁned as a forceful intervention
into a state by external agents with the ofﬁcial purpose of protecting the civilians of the
target state from widespread deprivations of internationally recognized human rights
(Smith, 2007; Mindzie, 2010; Jahn, 2012).3 Previous research on why states participate
in humanitarian interventions consists of a myriad of competing theories, taking into
account various levels of analysis, independent factors and causal mechanisms.4
As a contribution to the previous research, this article demonstrates that we need to
take into account factors from a number of particular perspectives in order to explain
the Swedish case. First of all, insights from the constructivist perspective on
humanitarian intervention decision making are needed. Constructivists argue that
the increasing use of humanitarian intervention since the end of the Cold War is
mainly the result of states having incorporated ethics, values and ‘other-regarding’
concerns into their foreign policies to a greater extent than before (Wheeler, 2000;
Finnemore, 2003; Bellamy, 2004; Chandler, 2004; Glanville, 2006). Thus, according
to constructivist thinking, states can perceive humanitarian intervention as ‘a moral
duty, a sense of obligation, about the appropriate response of states to crimes against
humanity being committed in other states’ (Glanville, 2006, p. 158). The subsequent
empirical analysis demonstrates that the Swedish decision reﬂected, in part, feelings
of altruism, that is a desire to help ‘individuals in need and who are not part of the
own nation’ (Krieg, 2013, p. 50). Thus, the Swedish government perceived the
humanitarian situation in Libya as dire and very alarming, and this perception
contributed to its deployment of troops. However, as revealed in the empirical
analysis, altruism was a necessary, but not a sufﬁcient, reason for the decision.
In order to explain the Swedish case, we also need to incorporate a rationalist
perspective on the decision making. In contrast to constructivism, rationalist
researchers claim that foreign policy is ‘business as usual’, emphasizing various
forms of self-interest in decisions to intervene (Neack, 1995; Krauthammer, 1999;
Gibbs, 2000; Mearsheimer, 2001; Hildebrandt et al, 2013). By incorporating
constructivist and rationalist perspectives into the same framework, the article builds
on a small but growing literature on humanitarian intervention decision making
(Shannon, 2000; Glanville, 2006; Ward, 2010; Krieg, 2013). This literature is based
on the assumption that, even if political leaders have an inclination to help others, the
actual willingness to do so depends on other circumstances. As argued by Krieg
(2013, p. 50): ‘Since even the most altruistic personalities do have limits in their
ability to do good for the beneﬁt of others without creating harm to themselves,
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altruistic action is naturally subject to selectivity’. Thus, if the decision to send troops
to save strangers is perceived by the government to impact negatively on its self-
interest, there will most likely be no intervention. The challenge for foreign policy
researchers is to identify the conditions under which a particular state perceives that it
can send troops to a humanitarian crisis without threatening its self-interest. This
approach builds on the insight of Hudson (2005) that we should aim for multi-causal
explanations in foreign policy research.
As demonstrated in the analysis, before it made the ﬁnal decision to intervene, the
government believed that four particular conditions needed to be fulﬁlled, which
decreased the political risks of participating in the intervention while also increasing
the beneﬁts of participating. The ﬁrst necessary condition was the international, legal
basis for the use of force, which was provided by the mandate from the UN Security
Council (UNSC). For the government, the maintenance of international law is of
particular importance, and, therefore, Sweden would not participate in a military
operation without a legal basis. This ﬁnding provides support to a particular body
of rationalist research that highlights the importance of international law for small
states such as Sweden (Keohane, 1969; Watson, 1982; Neumann and Gstöhl, 2004;
Thorhallsson and Wivel, 2006).5 According to this literature, small states favor
institutionalization of interstate relations, ‘because all members of international
institutions are usually subject to the same rules and face the same sanctions if they
break the rules. Thus, raw power matters less in an institutionalized environment’
(Thorhallsson and Wivel, 2006, p. 655). Although great powers may have institutional
privileges, international law ‘makes resource-based power effects more visible because
norms and rules are formalized and thus require justiﬁcation. This is a key reason why
small states highly value international law’ (Neumann and Gstöhl, 2004, p. 2). This
thinking characterized the Swedish decision making, as demonstrated below.
The second condition was that the operation was coordinated and executed by a
strong military actor, in this case, NATO. In contrast to a coalition of the willing,
NATO could provide the mission with a clear leadership structure, which for Sweden
is important for both practical and political reasons. In addition, when NATO decided
to take control of the mission, a situation in which the government could demonstrate
its support for the Western alliance was created. Sweden’s participation in the Libya
operation was, thus, related to a more overarching ambition of the government to
further strengthen its relationship to NATO. These ﬁndings can be related to the realist
perspective, which claims that material interests are always present in the foreign
policy calculations of states (Krauthammer, 1999; Gibbs, 2000; Mearsheimer, 2001;
Dueck, 2009). From this perspective, small states can join interventions in order to
strengthen their relationship to the leader of the operation, usually a great power. The
reason for this is that the small state perceives that stronger relations to the great power
will increase the small state’s security and its inﬂuence on the international arena.
The third condition was the broad parliamentary support for participating in the
no-ﬂy zone. The decision was facilitated by the actions made by opposition political
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parties, as these parties started to support participation in the operation earlier than the
government did so, thereby attempting to put pressure on the government. When the
government then decided to send troops to Libya, it knew that it could count on the
support of the opposition. These ﬁndings provide support for theories on the domestic
politics of military intervention (Howell and Pevehouse, 2005; Drury et al, 2010;
Kreps, 2010; Hildebrandt et al, 2013). According to this literature, when governments
send troops abroad, they want to make sure that the decision does not impact
negatively on their political power at home. One way of accomplishing this is to have
broad parliamentary support, so-called elite consensus, as it protects the government
from electoral punishment, if the military operation turns into failure (Kreps, 2010).
The fourth condition was that Sweden by coincidence had relevant military
resources on standby, which could be deployed quickly to Libya. Thus, the Swedish
decision making was characterized by an element of chance. This can be related to
insights from the ‘opportunity and willingness approach’ to state decisions to
intervene (Most and Starr, 1980; Siverson and Starr, 1990; Starr, 2005; Corbetta,
2010). According to this approach, even if an actor is willing to join a military
operation, it may not have the opportunity to do so, as it lacks the necessary military
capabilities. As noted by Starr (2005, p. 395) ‘Wishing for something to happen is
not enough – the capabilities to act for its fulﬁllment must be available’. The Swedish
case reveals this interplay between willingness and opportunity, and how it
contributed to the outcome of the case.
In sum, the Swedish decision was the result of a combination of factors, which
has not been recognized in previous research: feelings of altruism; a legal basis for
the operation; the involvement of a strong military actor in the coordination and
execution of the operation; broad parliamentary support; and the availability of
military resources.6 The next section demonstrates the way in which these factors
inﬂuenced the decision making. The ﬁnal section discusses the comparative
implications of the case.
Sweden’s Libya Decision
The eruption of the crisis and feelings of altruism, 13 January – 11 March
The Libyan crisis started with peaceful demonstrations against Colonel Muammar
Gaddaﬁ in Benghazi on 13 January 2011. These demonstrations were a part of the
larger Arab Spring movement that swept across North Africa and the Middle East
throughout 2011. As the protests in Libya developed into armed rebellion in mid-
February, Gaddaﬁ responded with systematic attacks by air and ground forces, often
against non-combatant civilians (Domansky et al, 2012, p. 2). As demonstrated below,
from mid-February, the Swedish government became more and more concerned about
the humanitarian situation in Libya. This view resulted in a government decision to
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provide humanitarian aid to Libya. However, humanitarian sentiments on their own
did not result in any attempts by the government to argue for a military intervention.
On 19 February, Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt referred on his personal blog
to the confrontations in Libya as ‘unfortunate’ and called on the European Union
(EU) to ‘condemn all acts of violence’ (Bildt, 2011a, 19 February). One day later, he
wrote that ‘we strongly condemn the violence against peaceful demonstrators’ and
that ‘we are extremely concerned about the current situation’ (Bildt, 2011a, 20
February). Moreover, Bildt perceived that Libya was on the brink of collapse, which
could lead to ‘widespread refugee ﬂows’ (Bildt, 2011a, 21 February).
On 21 February, Ibrahim Dabbashi, Libya’s deputy Permanent Ambassador to the
UN, who had abandoned Gaddaﬁ, called on the UN to impose a no-ﬂy zone over
Libya. Two days later, Dabbashi’s proposal was endorsed by French President Nicolas
Sarkozy (Watt and Wintour, 2011). Meanwhile, in Sweden, Prime Minister Fredrik
Reinfeldt expressed in an interview that no dictator in the world should be allowed to
remain in power and that he was startled by reports showing that Gaddaﬁ’s ﬁghter jets
had been used against unarmed civilians (Svensson, 2011). However, members of the
parliamentary opposition, most notably the Social Democratic Spokesperson in
Foreign Policy Issues, Urban Ahlin, and Gustav Fridolin of the Green Party, wanted
Reinfeldt and Bildt to be more forthright in their support for the democratic forces in
Libya (Fridolin, 2011; Pehrson, 2011). However, Bildt believed his earlier statements
had been very sharply worded, and accused the opposition for trying to discredit the
government (Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå, 2011a; Bildt, 2011b).
On 26 February, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1970, which considered the
violence against civilians in Libya to be crimes against humanity. It also froze the
assets of individuals implicated in human rights violations, while calling for an arms
embargo on Libya (UNSC Resolution, 1970). The resolution was fully supported by
the Arab League. On his blog, Bildt welcomed the UNSC decision and hoped that it
would ‘speed up the process in Tripoli and other areas still under the control of
Gaddaﬁ’ (Bildt, 2011a, 27 February). The next day, British Prime Minister David
Cameron proposed that a no-ﬂy zone could be used to prevent Gaddaﬁ from ‘using
his armored helicopters against civilians’ (MacDonald, 2011).
On 1 March, the USA Senate passed non-binding Resolution S.RES.85 calling for
the resignation of Gaddaﬁ and the possible establishment of a no-ﬂy zone. Two days
later, in a parliamentary debate in Sweden, Defense Minister Sten Tolgfors stated that
Sweden will provide humanitarian assistance to Libya but will not work for any
military solutions at this point in time (Parliament Records, 2011b, statement 63). On
9 March, the head of the Libyan National Transitional Council (NTC) pleaded for the
international community to move quickly to impose a no-ﬂy zone over Libya
(McGreal, 2011). Bildt confessed on his blog that he was surprised by the persistence
of the Gaddaﬁ regime, whose soldiers seemed to push back the rebels (Bildt, 2011a,
10 March). On 10 March, France recognized the NTC as the legitimate government
of Libya, and the following day, Cameron joined forces with Sarkozy demanding a
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no-ﬂy zone (Denselow, 2011). However, Bildt noted that all military options
considered by external states must be anchored in the UNSC and in the Arab League
(Bildt, 2011a, 10 March). On 11 March, the Swedish government with the rest of the
EU demanded the resignation of Gaddaﬁ, but the EU Heads of State were not in
agreement on whether military force should be used (Cendrowicz, 2011).
By mid-March, Swedish decision makers had perceived that the humanitarian
situation in Libya was acute and dire. However, this perception by itself did not lead
the government to conclude that it should work for the initiation of a no-ﬂy zone
within the frameworks of the UN or argue for participation in the operation suggested
by Britain and France. As noted by one senior civil servant at the Swedish Foreign
Ministry: ‘At this point in time Sweden was not pushing for international engage-
ment in Libya’ (Widman, 2013). If altruism had been the sole reason for the later
decision to join the operation, it seems reasonable to assume that the government
would have supported the establishment of a no-ﬂy zone more actively already in
mid-March. Instead the government adopted what can be called a ‘wait and see
approach’, in order to observe what the UNSC, NATO and the political opposition
were up to. Altruism can, nonetheless, be seen as one of several reasons for the ﬁnal
decision on 29 March. As stated by Widman (2013): ‘The government joined the
operation, among other things, because there was an urgent need for humanitarian
intervention and because the government felt an obligation to help’.7 However,
calculations of self-interest were also involved. As summed up by Tolgfors (2011),
‘Sweden helps others, not only because it is the right thing to do, but also because it
strengthens our own security’. In the government’s national strategy for participation
in peace operations, it is stated that, in addition to promoting universal values such as
‘justice’ and ‘human rights’, participation ‘also beneﬁts our national security and
Swedish interests’ (Government report, 2008, p. 3).
Resolution 1973, international law and domestic disagreements, 12–17 March
On 12 March, discussions on how to handle the Libyan crisis intensiﬁed within the
UNSC, which resulted in a proposal for a no-ﬂy zone by Lebanon’s Permanent
Ambassador to the UN on 15 March. The resolution was immediately backed by
Britain and France (Denselow, 2011). Later the same day, the Social Democratic
Parliamentary Group demanded that the government actively works for the
establishment of a no-ﬂy zone within the UN and that the government declares its
willingness to participate in it (Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå, 2011b). Bildt criticized
the Social Democrats for moving too fast on this issue, arguing that Sweden could
not participate in a no-ﬂy zone without a UNSC-mandate (Bildt, 2011a, 15 March).
The next day, Bildt said that, before the government decides on how Sweden
should act with regard to a possible no-ﬂy zone, we should await further
developments within the UNSC. He also argued that the operation needed to be
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executed by an actor with necessary military resources, most notably the USA or
NATO (Dagens nyheter, 2011).
In a parliamentary debate on 17 March, the government was accused by the Social
Democrats and the Left Party for being too passive in its support for the democratic
forces in Libya. The opposition also called on the government to work for the
establishment of a no-ﬂy zone (Parliament Records, 2011c, statements 11, 37, 111,
112, 120). Members from the Liberal Party and the Center Party were also in favor of
a no-ﬂy zone, but they were not as harsh in their critique toward the government
(Parliament Records, 2011c, statements 45, 72, 114, 115). Reinfeldt recognized that
the humanitarian situation in Libya was very alarming, and he condemned Gaddaﬁ’s
disproportional use of violence against civilians (Parliament Records, 2011c,
statement 10). However, he said that the issue of a no-ﬂy zone should be discussed
within the frameworks of NATO and the UN (Parliament Records, 2011c, statement
12). A peace operation, according to the Prime Minister, must be authorized by the
UNSC and have support from relevant regional actors. In addition, a strong military
actor needed to execute the operation (Parliament Records, 2011c, statements 14, 36,
40, 73). For the time being, the Prime Minister argued, Sweden should focus its
efforts on sending humanitarian aid to Libya (Parliament Records, 2011c, statement
46). During the debate, Bildt noted that Sweden should ‘wait and see what NATO is
up to. This is of signiﬁcance. The hard military actions we are referring to can only be
executed by NATO and the USA. We must be prepared to show our support to them’
(Parliament Records, 2011c, statement 118). He further stated that:
The government of Sweden has no plans for sending Swedish soldiers into
battle in Libya. We want to stop tanks, artillery and massacres. That demands a
clear UN-mandate, and we hope to get it, the sooner the better. We hope to help
people in need. We want to support the UN and we must have a preparedness
to help the USA, NATO and its member states. (Parliament Records, 2011c,
statement 134)
Later the same day, the UNSC passed Resolution 1973, which authorized a no-ﬂy
zone and the use of all means necessary short of foreign occupation to protect
civilians. The resolution also supported the principle of the Responsibility to Protect
(R2P) by emphasizing the responsibility of Libyan authorities to protect the civilian
population (UNSC Resolution, 1973).8 The resolution was approved by a vote of
10 in favor, zero against and ﬁve abstentions (from China, Russia, Brazil, Germany
and India).
The UNSC mandate provided the operation with a legal basis, and thereby one
obstacle to Swedish military involvement had disappeared. Within the Swedish
Foreign Ministry, the maintenance of international law is a ‘primary goal’ (Widman,
2013), and it permeates much of the ministry’s preparatory work before participating
in military operations abroad (Government report, 2008, p. 8; Hydén, 2013). As
noted by one senior civil servant at the Foreign Ministry: ‘Whether the operation is
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authorized by international law or not is the ﬁrst question we ask ourselves’ (Hydén,
2013). Why is the maintenance of international law so important for Sweden? The
reason for this is, according to the government, that Sweden as a small state with
relatively limited economic and political means is particularly dependent on a strong
international legal system, as institutionalization of interstate relations reduces the
importance of raw power resources (Hydén, 2013; Widman, 2013). ‘For us,
international law is the ﬁrst line of defense. This is not just words; it is a matter of
fact’ (Widman, 2013).9
The involvement of NATO and the road toward elite consensus, 18–28 March
On 18 March, Bildt welcomed the legal basis for the mission, while also underlining
that Sweden had no current plans to assist in the operation, but that any NATO request
would be considered (Bildt, 2011a, 18 March). ‘NATO must ﬁrst take a decision and
decide on its military contribution. We will then see if they need to solicit other
countries’, he explained. Bildt was once again heavily criticized by Ahlin, who stated
that: ‘For me, it is irrelevant if the request comes from France, the UN or from NATO.
The UN has called for the mission’ (Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå, 2011c).
On 19 March, a coalition joint task force began launching air operations in Libya
to enforce the no-ﬂy zone.10 The next day, the Swedish Armed Forces informed the
government that it could dispatch up to eight JAS 39 Gripen planes to Libya on a
10-day standby. At the same time, members of the Liberal Party and the Christian
Democratic Party criticized Bildt for waiting for a NATO request rather than
offering Swedish help (Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå, 2011d). On his blog, Bildt
pointed out that a role for Sweden in the operation was by no means certain (Bildt,
2011a, 20 March).
According to a Demoskop poll published in the Expressen daily on 22 March, 65
per cent of Swedes supported participation in a UN military operation in Libya, while
33 per cent were skeptical. However, Bildt declined to give any conﬁrmation on how
imminent Swedish involvement in the mission was: ‘We don’t know, because we
don’t know how the operation is going to be organized yet. However, we are
prepared to contribute with what’s needed and with what we are good at’ (Sandberg,
2011). Later the same day, Operation Uniﬁed Protector commenced as a NATO-led
mission to enforce the UN-arms embargo.
On 23 March, the Swedish Ministry of Defense requested the Armed Forces to
suggest a detailed plan for a possible Swedish contribution to the Libya operation
(Government bill, 2011, p. 4). The following day, NATO agreed that it would
assume responsibility for the no-ﬂy zone on 29 March at the latest, and intensive
discussions between Bildt and the Secretary General of NATO, Anders Fogh
Rasmussen, were initiated (Bildt, 2011a, 24 March). It seems that, during these
discussions, Rasmussen made an informal request to Bildt, asking whether Sweden
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would be interested in joining the operation (Associated Press, 2011; Benigh and
Magnusson, 2011). On his blog Bildt noted that he hoped for NATO taking control
of the operation as soon as possible, and when that happened, Sweden would decide
on its own contribution (Bildt, 2011a, 27 March).
On 27 March, NATO assumed full responsibility for the no-ﬂy zone and all other
military aspects of the UNSC resolution. The following day, Bildt confessed on his
blog that ‘it is important that we participate [in the NATO operation] in one way or
the other’ (Bildt, 2011a, 28 March). On the morning of 29 March, the Foreign
Ministry received a formal request from NATO, welcoming a Swedish contribution
to the operation (Foreign Ministry, 2011), and shortly thereafter the government
and the opposition could agree that Sweden would participate in the operation with
ﬁghter jets.11 According to both Cederberg (2013) and Göthe (2013), the idea of
using ﬁghter jets for the ﬁrst time since the 1960s came from the ‘highest political
level’, indicating that it was a ‘top-down initiative’. The agreement between the
government and the opposition implied that the ﬁghter jets only would maintain the
no-ﬂy zone, while not engaging in combat actions against targets on the ground (see
also below).
Why was it so important for the government that NATO took control of the
operation? First, in the view of the government, NATO could, in contrast to a
coalition of the willing, provide the operation with a clear leadership structure (Bildt,
2011c; Cederberg, 2013; Widman, 2013). Without a clear leadership structure, it
becomes more difﬁcult for Sweden to obtain political inﬂuence within the operation
and to make sure that its military units conduct the ‘right’ assignments (Widman,
2013). Despite not being a member of the alliance, it is easier for Sweden to take part
within a NATO-led effort, as its military is familiar with procedures following
previous cooperation (Government report, 2008; Bildt, 2011c). As stated by Bildt
(2011c) ‘Following the successful pattern in other operations, we expect to consult
closely with Allies and Partners on all political and military matters relating to the
conduct of the mission’.
Second, when NATO took control of the operation, a situation in which the
government could demonstrate its support for NATO was created. The government
explicitly refers to its ‘partnership with NATO’ as a ‘central basis for Swedish
foreign, security and defense policy’ (Government report, 2008, p. 4). One way of
maintaining this partnership is to contribute to peace operations. By doing so,
Sweden proves its worth without being a member. The partnership is, in turn,
important for maintaining and strengthening Sweden’s security and its inﬂuence on
the international arena.
By participating in international operations Sweden not only contributes to the
security of others, but we also increase our own security, while we at the same
time gain useful experiences for the development of our own national crisis
management capability. (Government report, 2008, p. 6)
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Thus, one reason for participating in peace operations seems to be based on
security concerns, such as developing Sweden’s crisis management capacity,
including the interoperability of its armed forces (Government report, 2008, p. 12).
As noted by one senior civil servant at the Ministry of Defense: ‘It was important
that our planes participated in a real operation and, thereby, gained valuable
experiences’ (Anclair, 2013).12 In addition, another high-level civil servant noted
that, by participating in NATO operations, the government demonstrates that
Sweden, after decades of formal non-alignment, belongs to the NATO community.
By demonstrating its solidarity and that Sweden is a ‘player’, the likelihood that
NATO will help Sweden in the future increases. By participating in peace
operations, Sweden can also promote regional stability, which beneﬁts Swedish
security by decreasing the risk for terrorism, refugee ﬂows or drug trafﬁcking,
according to the government’s thinking (Tolgfors, 2011). Participation in NATO
operations is also one way of obtaining inﬂuence: ‘The participation increases our
credibility, which is useful for us in several different areas within our partnership
with NATO’, as stated in a Government report (2008, p. 12). As noted by Göthe
(2013), for the government, it is important to sit at those tables where the most
important decisions on European security are made. ‘Based on our experiences
from participating in Afghanistan, we know that participation in NATO operations
can increase our inﬂuence’ (Anclair, 2013).
Moreover, in comparison with the political opposition, the government has a more
positive view of NATO as a peace promoting organization, and the discussions on a
possible contribution to Libya had been preceded by increasing critique from the
opposition toward Sweden’s deployment in Afghanistan and the leadership of
NATO in that operation (Ahlin, 2011; Tolgfors, 2011; Parliament Records, 2011a,
statements 6, 8, 47; Göthe, 2013). Thus, one civil servant noted that, for the
government, it was important to demonstrate that NATO was an organization that
could contribute to humanitarian operations. By doing so, arguments for a continued
Swedish presence in Afghanistan would be strengthened. The government’s Libya
decision was thus linked to the Afghanistan issue and the government’s desire to
inﬂuence the views of the opposition in that issue.
Furthermore, the decision cannot be explained without reference to the broad
parliamentary support. When the government decided that Sweden would participate
in the operation, it knew that it could count on the opposition, as the opposition had
committed itself to military action before the government had done so. Why was
broad parliamentary support so important for the government? First, the government
could not commit Sweden to military action without the support from Parliament,
because, according to Swedish law, the approval of Parliament is required for
sending armed forces to another country. Second, broad support in Parliament, so-
called elite consensus, protects the government from electoral punishment, if the
military operation turns into failure. In case the operation fails, all of the parties have
to stand accountable, and none of them can score political points after the policy
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failure. Thus, the parliamentary opposition can be said to have acted as a facilitating
factor in this case.
However, government ofﬁcials said that the no-ground-attacks caveat was the
result of demands made by the opposition, in particular by the newly appointed
Social Democratic Party Leader, Håkan Juholt (Bildt, 2011a, 29 March; Parliament
Records, 2011d, statements 1, 15; Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå, 2011e). In that case, the
opposition was also a constraining factor. However, it is unclear to what extent
Reinfeldt and Bildt actually were prepared to allow the ﬁghter jets to engage in ground
attacks. They might have been quite relieved over the no-ground-attacks demand, as it
implied less political risks, as suggested by one civil servant. By holding the Social
Democrats responsible for the caveat, however, they could score some political points
among their own constituencies. Juholt could at the same time strengthen his political
image by taking credit for constraining the government’s behavior.
The Swedish military contribution and the Nordic Battle Group (NBG),
29 March – 2 April
The government bill on participation in the operation was ﬁnalized on the morning of
29 March. According to the bill, the contribution was limited to sending eight JAS 39
Gripen jets for the international air campaign, a Saab 340 AEW&C for airborne early
warning and control, and a C-130 Hercules for aerial refueling. The contribution
would amount to approximately 130 people and would be made available for 3
months.13 If necessary, the forces would be strengthened; however, the contribution
would not exceed 250 people all in all (Government bill, 2011). The bill justiﬁed the
military engagement on the basis of Sweden’s obligations under international law:
Sweden shall contribute to the military effort in order to enforce UNSC
Resolution, 1973. The UN has established that grave and systematic crimes
against human rights occur and that the widespread and systematic attacks on
civilians can amount to crimes against humanity. (Government bill, 2011, p. 9)
However, in the bill, there was no explicit reference to the R2P. As a matter of fact,
during the period of February–April 2011, there were hardly any ofﬁcial statements
made by the government in support of the R2P. Thus, the Swedish support for
Resolution 1973 reﬂected a desire to help protect civilians in Libya, but it did not
express any verbal support for the long-term strengthening of the R2P.
In an address to Parliament later the same day, Reinfeldt summarized the most
important conditions for the Swedish participation: ‘Sweden will take its responsi-
bility for peace and security when our fellow human beings are threatened, when the
UN decides to act, and when we have the ability to do so’ (Parliament Records,
2011d, statement 1). He also stated that, in order for Sweden to participate in UN
operations, the operation should be coordinated and executed by a strong military
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actor. Another condition, according to Reinfeldt, was the broad parliamentary
support:
Sending Swedish women and men to protect civilians in a foreign country is
not to be treated casually. It is never risk-free. Therefore, for Sweden to
shoulder its responsibility, it is imperative that there is broad support in
Parliament. The government welcomes the close cooperation with the opposi-
tion in this important matter. (Parliament Records, 2011d, statement 1)
The no-ground-attacks caveat was disliked by several members of the governing
parties, who blamed the political opposition (Parliament Records, 2011d, statements 1,
15). The head of the Liberal Party, Jan Björklund, stated that the ‘Social Democrats
were very quick to criticize the government for not acting, but now when it is a reality,
they are afraid to make a stand’ (Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå, 2011e). Juholt
responded: ‘We don’t know how the Libyan units are put together. For all we know
they could be drugged children or child soldiers. We have no idea what is waiting for
us on the ground, so it is too risky to expose ourselves to this’ (Tidningarnas
Telegrambyrå, 2011e). However, as noted above, Reinfeldt and Bildt thought that the
caveat was necessary in order to reach consensus among the main political parties
(Bildt, 2011a, 29 March; Parliament Records, 2011d, statement 1).
On 31 March, the Secretary General of NATO travelled to Sweden to discuss
NATO–Sweden relations. In a speech delivered at the Swedish Institute of International
Affairs, Rasmussen praised Sweden for its commitment to the Libya operation: ‘I
strongly welcome the decision of the Swedish government to contribute to our common
endeavor. Sweden has once again clearly shown it solidarity with the international
community and its ﬁrm commitment to protect civilians’ (Rasmussen, 2011).14
The Swedish deployment was formally approved by Parliament on 1 April. Only
the right-wing, nationalist Sweden Democrats was opposed. The parliamentary
report emphasized that the international society must engage on long term to the
beneﬁt of Libyan democracy, human rights, social development and rule of law
(Parliamentary Report, 2011). A reference to the R2P had also been included in the
report: ‘the Committee welcomes the decision made by the UNSC on 17 March,
expressing its support for the principle of R2P, which was approved by the UN 2005
World Summit’ (Parliamentary Report, 2011, p. 8). This phrase was most likely
included after demands made by the political opposition. The Swedish aircrafts left
for Sigonella Air Base, Italy, on 2 April.
The ﬁnal necessary condition for the rapid Swedish contribution to the moni-
toring of the no-ﬂy zone between April–June 2011 was that the aircrafts were part
of the Expeditionary Air Wing (EAW), which at the time was on standby within the
EU NBG.15 In addition to providing Sweden with the actual capabilities for
maintaining the no-ﬂy zone, it also implied that the Swedish soldiers had a mental
preparedness, had conducted exercises before the Libya operation, and had the
necessary knowledge and understanding of the system they would be a part of
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(Göthe, 2013; Wilson, 2013).16 As noted by Egnell (2012, p. 12) ‘when the political
decision was made, the unit simply had to take off and apply the systems already in
place’. Thus, by coincidence, Sweden had relevant military resources on standby,
which could be deployed quickly to Libya. The Swedish decision making was in that
way characterized by an element of chance. If the NBG had been on standby 1 year
earlier, the government would most likely not have been able to commit Sweden to
the operation until much later, if at all. In addition, the planes were fully compatible
with NATO interoperability standards and had previously been used in NATO
exercises (Egnell, 2012, p. 22).
Conclusions
The Swedish decision to send troops to Libya can be seen as the result of a
combination of factors: altruism; the legal basis for the operation; the involvement of
a strong military actor; broad parliamentary support; and the availability of military
resources.17 Without one of the factors, the government would most likely not have
committed Sweden to the operation. While altruism seems to have been necessary for
creating a sense of obligation to act on the part of the government, the other four
factors were necessary for creating a situation in which the government perceived
that it could act without detriment to its self-interest.
What then are the comparative implications of this case study? First, the
combination of factors might be used as an analytical tool for explaining other
decisions on humanitarian intervention made by liberal democratic small states.
When an intervention in Syria was high on the agenda of several Western powers in
August–September 2013, Sweden stated that it would not take part in such an
enterprise. Although the government had a clear humanitarian purpose for joining
an intervention in Syria, and the operation would have been led by a strong actor,
the operation would have lacked international authorization and parliamentary
support. In addition, Sweden did not have available and relevant military resources.
Without one of the conditions, Sweden will most likely not participate in the
particular operation, and, here, three out of ﬁve circumstances were absent.
Looking at Finland’s decision not to participate in the Libya operation, it seems
that four of the ﬁve factors were present. What was lacking in the Finnish case
seems to have been broad parliamentary support. With General Elections being
held on 17 April 2011, it seems reasonable to assume that most parties perceived
the political risks of involving Finland in a military operation to be too high.
However, the issue should be investigated further by conducting a comparative
study of Finnish and Swedish decision making. By including Denmark and
Norway, which decided to participate immediately after the operation had been
authorized by the UNSC, comparisons between non-aligned and aligned small
states can also be conducted.
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Notes
1 The government at the time was a non-socialist coalition composed of the Moderate Party, the Liberal
Party, the Center Party and the Christian Democratic Party.
2 However, Sweden is a member of the Partnership for Peace, it conducts military exercises with NATO,
and it has participated in almost every NATO mission since the end of the Cold War (Dahl, 2012, p. 2).
3 In a humanitarian intervention, the interveners face a hostile environment when trying to stop a human
rights crisis, unlike a peace keeping or a relief mission, in which the governing agent in the target state
agrees to the interveners’ presence (Gibbs, 2000, p. 42).
4 Comprehensive reviews of this literature are provided byWard (2010); Aubone (2013) and Krieg (2013).
5 Following Keohane (1969, p. 293), a small state is here deﬁned in terms of its perceived role in the
international system: A small state ‘is a state whose leaders consider that it cannot act alone effectively
but may be able to have systemic impact in a small group or through an international institution’. A
great power, on the other hand, ‘is a state whose leaders consider that it can, alone, exercise a large,
perhaps decisive, impact on the international system’ (Keohane, 1969, p. 296). For a recent discussion
on the concept of small states, see Kassimeris (2009).
6 The empirical foundation for these claims is based on a multitude of different sources, including
government bills and reports, speeches and remarks made by key decision makers, parliamentary
records, media coverage, blog entries by the Swedish Foreign Minister, secondary sources and
interviews with high-level civil servants from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of
Defense. In order to establish empirically that a certain factor, for instance, altruism, contributed to the
decision, its importance should be explicitly referred to in different documents and by different
decision makers on several occasions and in different contexts. In addition, there should be a clear
temporal relationship between changes in the independent factor and changes in the willingness of the
government to participate in the intervention, that is the change in the dependent variable should be
preceded in time by a change in the independent variable. The explanatory relevance of a particular
factor is then evaluated on the basis of interviews with civil servants, who had important positions in
the decision-making process leading up to the Swedish deployment of troops to Libya.
7 More sources supporting this argument are provided in the subsequent sections.
8 The R2P was approved at the UN General Assembly 2005 World Summit. It consists of a set of
principles, based on the idea that sovereignty is not a right, but a responsibility. R2P focuses on
preventing four crimes: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. It has
three ‘pillars’: a state has a responsibility to protect its population from mass atrocities; the international
community has a responsibility to assist the state to fulﬁll its primary responsibility; and, if the state
fails to protect its citizens from mass atrocities and peaceful measures have failed, the international
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community has the responsibility to intervene through coercive measures such as economic sanctions.
Military intervention is considered the last resort.
9 In contrast with previous Swedish governments, the Reinfeldt government has a somewhat more
skeptical view of the UN (Dahl, 2012, p. 5). Of essential importance to the present government is that the
operation is authorized by international law, and that can be accomplished either through a mandate in the
UNSC or by an invitation from the host state (Hydén, 2013). Thus, depending on the situation, a UNSC
mandate is not a prerequisite for Sweden taking part in military operations abroad. As stated in a
Government report (2008, p. 9): ‘In acute situations, when the UNSC does not shoulder its responsibility,
Sweden must, after careful evaluation, nevertheless decide what can be done to ease human suffering’.
10 The initial coalition was composed of Belgium, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Italy, Norway,
Qatar, Spain and the USA. The coalition was then expanded to 19 states, including Sweden.
11 In contrast to the UN system, formal requests are usually not sent to member states or partner states
within the NATO structure. In the Swedish case, a formal request was nonetheless needed for the
domestic debate and NATO therefore provided such a request (Egnell, 2012, p. 12).
12 Anclair (2013) adds that, while ‘gaining valuable experiences’ was important for the government and
the Swedish Armed Forces, this was not the sole or main reason for participating in the operation.
13 The mission covered the period from 1 April to 26 June. The formal purpose was only to defend the no-
ﬂy zone through Tactical Air Reconnaissance (TAR). This implied that the Swedish military could not
gather intelligence with regard to civilians in danger or breaches of the weapons embargo. In a
parliamentary decision on 17 June, the mission was extended to 24 October with a mandate that
covered TAR across the full spectrum of UN-mandated tasks, including the enforcement of the arms
embargo and the protection of civilians (Egnell, 2012, p. 30).
14 As argued by Dahl (2012, p. 6), Sweden’s participation in the Libya operation conﬁrmed the country’s
position as a reliable partner, leading, among other things, to Sweden being invited to take part in the
NATO Crisis Management Exercise in the fall of 2011.
15 The NBG is one of the 18 EU battle groups. It consists of around 2200 soldiers, with manpower
contributed from Sweden, Finland, Norway, Ireland, Estonia and Latvia. The second alert period of the
NBG was between 1 January and 30 June 2011, meaning that all personnel shall be at their operating
bases within 48 hours after the decision to initiate an operation is made.
16 The EAW was a self-sufﬁcient unit that had all ‘the necessary command structures, logistics, ground
staff, and mission support elements, including the all-important photo interpreters. The unit also had a
complete set of standing orders, standard operating procedures, and months of training behind them’
(Egnell, 2012, p. 12).
17 An alternative explanation is that the major aim was to market the JAS Gripen for an international audience
of potential buyers (Hoppe, 2011). However, this explanation does not seem to hold water. If the gov-
ernment had been interested in selling Gripen, it would probably have used these planes in Afghanistan. In
addition, a successful display from the airplanes would have increased their market value, but an unsuccess-
ful display would have decreased their value, and a successful display was in no way certain. Another alter-
native explanation is that the Swedish decision aimed at demonstrating solidarity with the EU, in particular
with EU members with geographic proximity to Libya. However, although this factor may have played
some role in the decision making, it was not part of the deliberations in planning for the Libya operation, as
noted by both Göthe (2013) and Widman (2013). Looking at the historical record, Swedish participation in
peace operations has not been limited to conﬂicts with close geographic proximity to the EU.
References
Ahlin, U. (2011) Utrikespolitiken är tyst och passiv. Svenska dagbladet 16 February.
Anclair, Å. (2013) Interview with Deputy Director Åsa Anclair, Department for Strategy and Security
Policy, Ministry of Defense, 31 October.
Doeser
210 © 2014 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748 International Politics Vol. 51, 2, 196–213
Ångström, J. (2010) Försvarsmaktens internationella insatser: I den svenska säkerhetens eller identitetens
tjänst? In: K. Engelbrekt and J. Ångström (eds.) Svensk säkerhetspolitik i Europa och världen.
Stockholm: Norstedts, pp. 169–202.
Associated Press. (2011) Sweden asked to join Libya no-ﬂy zone. The Spectator 29 March, http://www
.thespec.com/news-story/2201674-sweden-asked-to-join-libya-no-ﬂy-zone/, accessed 5 September
2013.
Aubone, A. (2013) Explaining US unilateral military intervention in civil conﬂicts: A review of the
literature. International Politics 50(2): 278–302.
Bellamy, A.J. (2004) Motives, outcomes, intent and the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention. Journal
of Military Ethics 3(3): 216–232.
Benigh, L. and Magnusson, Ö. (2011) Nato har frågat Sverige om Jas-plan till Libyen. Sveriges television,
28 March, http://www.svt.se/nyheter/varlden/nato-har-fragat-sverige-om-jas-plan-till-libyen-1, accessed
18 September 2013.
Bildt, C. (2011a) Personal blog, various dates, http://carlbildt.wordpress.com/, accessed between 25 March
and 14 August 2013.
Bildt, C. (2011b) Svar på skriftlig fråga 2010/11:326: Protesterna i Libyen, 7 March.
Bildt, C. (2011c) Speech held at International Conference on Libya, London, 29 March.
Björkdahl, A. (2013) Ideas and norms in Swedish peace policy. Swiss Political Science Review 19(3):
322–337.
Cederberg, J. (2013) Interview with Senior Adviser Jörgen Cederberg, Head of Section for Defense Policy
and Civil Contingencies, Department for Strategy and Security Policy, Ministry of Defense, 31 October.
Cendrowicz, L. (2011) EU unites against Gaddaﬁ, but not on what’s next. Time World 11 March, http://
www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2058534,00.html, accessed 20 August 2013.
Chandler, D. (2004) Culture wars and international intervention: An ‘inside/out’ view of the decline of
national interest. International Politics 41(3): 354–374.
Corbetta, R. (2010) Determinants of third parties’ intervention and alignment choices in ongoing conﬂicts,
1946–2001. Foreign Policy Analysis 6(1): 61–85.
Dagens nyheter. (2011) Chatt med Carl Bildt om krisen i Libyen. 16 March.
Dahl, A.-S. (2012) Partner Number One or NATO Ally Twenty-nine? Rome: NATO Defense College.
Research Paper 82.
Dalsjö, R. (1995) Sveriges intressen och roll vad gäller fredsfrämjande operationer. In: B. Huldt, G. Welin
and T. Örn (eds.) Bevara eller skapa fred. Stockholm: Norstedts förlag, pp. 307–324.
Denselow, J. (2011) Libya and Lebanon: A troubled relationship. The Guardian 16 March, http://www.
guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/mar/16/libya-lebanon-un-security-council-resolution, accessed 5
March 2013.
Domansky, K., Jensen, R. and Bryson, R. (2012) Canada and the Libya coalition. Journal of Military and
Strategic Studies 14(3): 1–29.
Drury, L.A.C., Overby, M., Ang, A. and Li, Y. (2010) Pretty prudent or ‘rhetorically responsive’? The
American public’s support for military action. Political Research Quarterly 63(1): 83–98.
Dueck, C. (2009) Neoclassical realism and the national interest: Presidents, domestic politics, and military
interventions. In: S.E. Lobell, N.M. Ripsman and J.W. Taliaferro (eds.) Neoclassical Realism, the State,
and Foreign Policy. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, pp. 139–169.
Egnell, R. (2012) The Swedish Experience in Operation Uniﬁed Protector. Stockholm: Stockholm Center
for Strategic Studies.
Finnemore, M. (2003) The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force. Cornell,
NY: Cornell University Press.
Foreign Ministry. (2011) Regeringen föreslår Libyeninsats. Pressmeddelande, 29 March.
Fridolin, G. (2011) Skriftlig fråga 2010/11:326: Protesterna i Libyen, 22 February.
Gibbs, D.N. (2000) Realpolitik and humanitarian intervention: The case of Somalia. International Politics
37(1): 41–55.
Sweden’s Libya decision
211© 2014 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748 International Politics Vol. 51, 2, 196–213
Glanville, L. (2006) Norms, interests and humanitarian intervention. Global Change, Peace and Security
18(3): 153–171.
Göthe, P. (2013) Interview with Deputy Director-General Peter Göthe, (former) Head of Department for
Strategy and Security Policy, Ministry of Defense, 8 October.
Government bill. (2011) Regeringens proposition 2010/11:111. Svenskt deltagande i den internationella
militära insatsen i Libyen.
Government report. (2008) Regeringens skrivelse 2007/08:51. Nationell strategi för svenskt deltagande i
internationell freds- och säkerhetsfrämjande verksamhet.
Hildebrandt, T., Hillebrecht, C., Holm, P.M. and Pevehouse, J. (2013) The domestic politics of
humanitarian intervention: Public opinion, partisanship, and ideology. Foreign Policy Analysis 9(3):
243–266.
Hoppe, K. (2011) Varumärkesstrateg: Gripenplanens deltagande kan gynna försäljning. Dagens nyheter
30 March.
Howell, W.G. and Pevehouse, J.C. (2005) Presidents, congress, and the use of force. International
Organization 59(1): 209–232.
Hudson, V. (2005) Foreign policy analysis: Actor-speciﬁc theory and the ground of international relations.
Foreign Policy Analysis 1(1): 1–30.
Hydén, T. (2013) Interview with Deputy Director Therese Hydén, Head of Section for International Law
and Treaty Law, Department for International Law, Human Rights and Treaty Law, Ministry for
Foreign Affairs, 16 October.
Jahn, B. (2012) Humanitarian intervention – What’s in a name? International Politics 49(1): 36–58.
Kassimeris, C. (2009) The foreign policy of small powers. International Politics 46(1): 84–101.
Keohane, R.O. (1969) Liliputians’ dilemmas: Small states in international politics. International
Organization 23(2): 291–310.
Krauthammer, C. (1999) The short, unhappy life of humanitarian war. National Interest 74(1): 5–8.
Kreps, S. (2010) Elite consensus as a determinant of alliance cohesion: Why public opinion hardly matters
for NATO-led operations in Afghanistan. Foreign Policy Analysis 6(2): 191–215.
Krieg, A. (2013) Motivations for Humanitarian Intervention: Theoretical and Empirical Considerations.
London: Springer.
MacDonald, A. (2011) Cameron doesn’t rule out military force for Libya. The Wall Street Journal
1 March, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704615504576172383796304482.html?mod=
googlenews_wsj, accessed 20 August 2013.
McGreal, C. (2011) Gaddaﬁ’s army will kill half a million. The Guardian 12 March, http://www.guardian.
co.uk/world/2011/mar/12/gaddaﬁ-ar.
Mearsheimer, J.J. (2001) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W. W. Norton.
Mindzie, M.A. (2010) Intervention and protection in African crisis situations. Criminal Justice Ethics
29(2): 174–193.
Most, B.A. and Starr, H. (1980) Diffusion, reinforcement, geopolitics, and the spread of war. American
Political Science Review 74(4): 932–946.
Neack, L. (1995) UN peace-keeping: In the interest of community or self? Journal of Peace Research
32(2): 181–196.
Neumann, I.B. and Gstöhl, S. (2004) Lilliputians in Gulliver’s World? Small States in International
Relations. Reykjavik, Iceland: Center for Small State Studies.
Parliament Records. (2011a) Riksdagens protokoll 2010/11:60, 16 February.
Parliament Records. (2011b) Riksdagens protokoll 2010/11:66, 3 March.
Parliament Records. (2011c) Riksdagens protokoll 2010/11:74, 17 March.
Parliament Records. (2011d) Riksdagens protokoll 2010/11:78, 29 March.
Parliamentary Report. (2011) Sammansatta utrikes – och försvarsutskottets betänkande 2010/11:UFöU3,
31 March.
Pehrson, J. (2011) Kritiken mot Bildt växer. Svenska dagbladet 24 February.
Doeser
212 © 2014 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748 International Politics Vol. 51, 2, 196–213
Rasmussen, A.F. (2011) The new NATO and Sweden’s security. Speech in Stockholm, Sweden, 31
March.
Sandberg, K. (2011) Svenska folket: Sänd Jasplan till Libyen. Expressen 22 March.
Shannon, V.P. (2000) Norms are what states make of them: The political psychology of norm violation.
International Studies Quarterly 44(2): 293–316.
Siverson, R.M. and Starr, H. (1990) Opportunity, willingness, and the diffusion of war. American Political
Science Review 84(1): 47–67.
Smith, W. (2007) Anticipating a cosmopolitan future: The case of humanitarian military intervention.
International Politics 44(1): 72–89.
Starr, H. (2005) Territory, proximity, and spatiality: The geography of international conﬂict. International
Studies Review 7(3): 387–406.
Svensson, N. (2011) Reinfeldt: Ingen diktator ska sitta kvar. Expressen 22 February.
Thorhallsson, B. and Wivel, A. (2006) Small states in the European Union: What do we know and what
would we like to know? Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19(4): 651–668.
Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå. (2011a) Carl Bildt avfärdar kritik om Libyen-uttalande. Expressen
22 February.
Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå. (2011b) S kräver ﬂygförbud över Libyen. Sveriges television, 15 March,
http://www.svt.se/nyheter/sverige/s-kraver-ﬂygforbud-over-libyen, accessed 19 August 2013.
Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå. (2011c) Swedish house backs Libya involvement. The Local, 20 March,
http://www.thelocal.se/32734/20110321/, accessed 21 August 2013.
Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå. (2011d) Svenska Jas-plan redo på tio dagar. Göteborgs-Posten, 21 March,
http://www.gp.se/nyheter/sverige/1.577477-svenska-jas-plan-redo-pa-tio-dagar, accessed 5 March 2013.
Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå. (2011e) Government yes to Gripen deployment. The Local 29 March, http://
www.thelocal.se/32886/20110329/, accessed 21 August 2013.
Tolgfors, S. (2011) Socialdemokraterna försvårar Sveriges internationella ansvarstagande. Svenska
Dagbladet 11 May.
UNSC Resolution. (1970) S/RES/1970, adopted by the UNSC on 26 February 2011, http://www.un.org/
Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=S/RES/1970%20%282011%29, accessed 7 February 2014.
UNSC Resolution. (1973) S/RES/1973, adopted by the UNSC on 17 March 2011, http://www.un.org/
Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=S/RES/1973%20%282011%29, accessed 7 February 2014.
Ward, M.R. (2010) Identity in crisis: The politics of humanitarian intervention. PhD Thesis, The
University of Edinburgh, United Kingdom.
Watson, A. (1982) Diplomacy: The Dialogue between States. London: Methuen.
Watt, N. and Wintour, P. (2011) Libya no-ﬂy zone call by France fails to get Cameron’s backing.
The Guardian 23 February, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/23/libya-noﬂy-zone-david-
cameron, accessed 5 March 2013.
Wheeler, N.J. (2000) Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Widman, E. (2013) Interview with Deputy Director Erik Widman, Head of Europe Division, Security
Policy Department, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 27 September.
Wilson, S. (2013) Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Stefan Wilson, Commander of the Swedish Libya
operation between April–July 2011, 9 September.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution
3.0 Unported License. To view a copy of this license, visit
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
Sweden’s Libya decision
213© 2014 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1384-5748 International Politics Vol. 51, 2, 196–213
